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1) Introduction- 
 
Do superpower interventions to install and prop up political leaders in other countries 
subsequently result in more or less democracy, and does this effect vary depending on 
whether the intervening superpower is democratic or authoritarian?  While democracy 
may be expected to decline contemporaneously with superpower interference, the effect 
on democracy after a few years is far from obvious.  The absence of reliable information 
on covert interventions has hitherto served as an obstacle to seriously addressing these 
questions.  The recent declassification of Cold War CIA and KGB documents now makes 
it possible to systematically address these questions in the Cold War context, which is 
what we do.  Aside from being of considerable historical importance in its own right, a 
study of Cold War interventions is of great interest because it speaks directly to whether 
and how outside forces may alter the path of institutional evolution, in contrast to the 
usual focus on domestic actors.  This, of course, is an issue of special policy relevance to 
our time.   
 
As implied in the questions above, our interest is not in the contemporaneous effect of 
superpower interventions but rather on the effects after the passage of a few years.1  Our 
ex ante theoretical expectations on this issue are far from clear.  From one theoretical 
perspective one may reasonably expect the effects of superpower interventions to differ 
depending on whether the intervening superpower is a democracy or not.  For instance, 
superpower governments might have a preference for spreading their own form of 
government.  If the benefits of establishing democracies overseas exceed the costs for a 
                                                 
1 Unsurprisingly democracy does decline contemporaneously with superpower interventions. 
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democratic but not for an authoritarian superpower, interventions by a democratic 
superpower could subsequently result in more democratic environments than 
interventions by a non-democratic superpower.  However, one may also reasonably adopt 
the theoretical perspective that interventions by democratic and authoritarian 
superpowers alike are primarily driven by considerations of repressing opponents 
overseas.  Crony authoritarian regimes overseas offer less checks and balances against 
repression of opponents, which may cause democratic and non-democratic superpowers 
alike to favor the presence of crony dictators overseas.  If so we may expect interventions 
by a democratic and an authoritarian superpower to have similar adverse consequences 
for democracy in intervened countries.  The goal of this paper is to check which of these 
perspectives finds greater support in the Cold War data. 
 
In order to answer this question we develop a new panel dataset of superpower 
interventions during the Cold War.  Our goal is to examine the effects of a superpower 
intervention in a given five year period on the average level of democracy in the 
following five year period.  We find that superpower interventions are followed by 
significant declines in democracy and that the substantive effects are large.  Perhaps 
surprisingly US and Soviet interventions have equally detrimental effects on democracy; 
both decrease democracy in the subsequent five year period by about 33%.  Our findings 
thus indicate that one should not expect significant differences in the adverse institutional 
consequences of superpower interventions based on whether the intervening superpower 
is a democracy or a dictatorship.    
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This paper relates to literatures in both political science and economics.  In political 
science, our paper builds on recent work by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) on the 
effects of interventions in wars and other militarized disputes.  Our paper extends this 
work in three ways.  First, we do not focus exclusively on military interventions, but 
extend our examination to behind the scenes efforts by the secret services of the 
superpowers to install and prop up leaders in office.  Second, we do not limit ourselves to 
studying countries which are experiencing violent conflict, but also consider 
interventions with limited and no casualties.  This difference is significant because wars 
and militarized disputes are relatively rare events.  Third, we offer instruments for 
addressing questions of endogeneity, which is a serious concern because interventions 
may be driven by the anticipated state of the institutional environment. 
 
As far as economics is concerned, a large literature on the effect of institutions on 
economic development has begun to explore the first-stage determinants of institutions, 
including variables such as inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and colonizing strategies.  
Our paper differs from these in focusing on a relatively time varying determinant of 
institutions. 
 
In the next section of the paper we offer a brief review of the previous literature on 
interventions.  In Section 3 we describe our hypotheses relating interventions to 
institutions.  In Section 4 we describe our new panel data set of interventions and outline 
the rationale and sources for our control variables.  Section 5 describes how we address 
issues of identification.  In Section 6 we present our results, while Section 7 concludes. 
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2)  Literature review- 
 
The literature that specifically focuses on the institutional effects of interventions is 
concentrated in political science.  Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) have recently 
provided an excellent survey of this literature and we summarize some of the highlights 
below.  One group of studies focuses on military interventions and finds that 
interventions by democratic countries have a positive effect on democratic reform in the 
short term, but generate political instability in the long term.  (Kegley and Hermann, 
1997 and Gleditsch et al., 2004).  Another group of political scientists focuses more 
narrowly on cases of interventions by the US.  Some of the case study literature finds that 
US interventions are not associated with democratization and attributes this to US 
military and economic interests (Karl, 1990 and Rueschmeyer et al., 1992).  Other studies 
focus on the difficulty of imposing democracy from above.  (Herman and Broadhead, 
1984, O’Donnell et al., 1986, Whitehead, 1991.)   Yet another group of scholars finds 
that US interventions have a positive effect on democracy under some limited 
circumstances.  (Meernik, 1996, Wantchekon and Nickerson, 1999, Enterline and Greig, 
2003.)  
 
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs’ paper is the latest contribution to the interventions 
literature.  Their paper focuses on military interventions in wars and militarized interstate 
disputes and finds that this genre of interventions “lead to little if any improvement, and 
all too often erosion in the trajectory of democratic development.2”  They argue that this 
is because democratic and authoritarian leaders alike share a common interest in 
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preferring to deal with non-democratic target states.   In the case of authoritarian regimes, 
which they are argue are primarily concerned with providing private goods to 
government insiders, non-democratic target regimes facilitate the transfer of resources to 
insiders.  In the case of democratic regimes, which they argue are primarily concerned 
with providing public goods to their country’s citizens, non-democratic regimes in the 
target state facilitate policy concessions that benefit the intervener’s citizens.  
 
This paper advances the above literature in two ways.  First, the widespread availability 
of datasets on war and military interventions has led previous econometric studies to 
focus almost exclusively on interventions in the context of wars, to the neglect of behind 
the scenes interventions that were conducted by the secret services of the superpowers.  
Second, while undeniably insightful, the literature on interventions has hitherto not 
seriously addressed issues of reverse causality. This paper seeks to advance our 
understanding of interventions by filling these gaps in the literature. 
  
This paper also attempts to advance the literature on institutions in economics.  This 
literature is growing rapidly, partly of interest in its own right and partly as a side effect 
of searching for instruments for institutions to use in empirical exercises assessing the 
effects of institutions on other variables.  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) in a seminal 
paper stress inequality as a key (negative) factor in the evolution of institutions in North 
and South America; Easterly (2007), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Satyanath and 
Subramanian (2007) confirm this for the worldwide sample. The famous work by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005) stresses colonizing strategies as a historical determinant of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, 627. 
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institutions, using settler health conditions as a determinant of whether the colonizer 
followed a settler colony strategy or an exploitative strategy.  Mauro (1995), Easterly and 
Levine (1997, 2003), and Alesina et al. (2003) focus on ethnic fractionalization as an 
adverse factor inhibiting institutional development; Alesina et al. (2007) suggest that 
colonial partitioning of ethnic groups and other forms of artificial boundary drawing 
made things even worse.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) also stress long run factors like 
inequality, share of agriculture in production, and natural resource endowments in their 
magisterial work on determinants of democracy. Our paper extends this literature by 
focusing on a recent set of political shocks that influenced democracy – Cold War 
interventions by the superpowers. 
 
Our paper has a much more distant relation to the extensive branch of the literature which 
looks at the success of foreign “peacekeeping” forces in ending wars (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000, Gilligan and Stedman 2004, Weinstein 2005), which is in turn related to 
the literature on the determinants of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2001, and 
2002, World Bank 2003, Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004) and the literature on 
what to do about “failed states” (Collier 2007, Birdsall et al (2006), Weinstein et al. 
(2004), Council on Foreign Relations (2005), and Brainard (2007)).  Although we share 
the interest in foreign intervention, our paper deals with a different subject than these 
papers do -- we are looking at foreign interventions that are explicitly concerned with 
leadership selection and maintenance rather than “peacekeeping”or fixing “failed states”. 
Our results still may have some indirect relevance for this very different debate, however, 
since both focus on the effects of foreign intervention. 
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3) Hypothesis on the relationship between superpower interventions and 
democracy- 
 
This paper attempts to sort out which of two theoretical perspectives finds greater support 
in the Cold War data.  To take the first, one may expect superpower governments to have 
a preference for spreading their own form of government.  The benefits of establishing 
democracies overseas may then exceed the costs for a democratic but not for an 
authoritarian superpower.  From such a perspective interventions by a democratic 
superpower could result in more democratic (less authoritarian) environments than 
interventions by a non-democratic superpower.   
 
However, it is also plausible that an inclination favoring the spread of democracy on the 
part of a democratic superpower may be swamped by other, realpolitik related, 
considerations.  Interventions by both superpowers may be primarily aimed at repressing 
threats to its security overseas (communist opponents in the case of the US, and non-
communist opponents in the case of the Soviet Union).  Under such circumstances, the 
survival in office of a superpower-installed chief executive plausibly hinges on providing 
the superpower that installed him what it wants by way of repressive policies.  
Repression of communists/anti-communists is plausibly easiest for a chief executive to 
implement if he is unconstrained from seeking the approval of a large number of 
domestic political actors prior to implementing the repressive measures.  It is thus in the 
interest of a superpower-installed chief executive to attempt to reduce the domestic 
checks and balances on his power.  It is not in the interest of any superpower (democratic 
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or undemocratic) which has placed a priority on repressing opponents overseas to oppose 
such attempts at centralization of power, since checks and balances are likely to make 
repression more difficult.  Thus, from this perspective we may plausibly expect 
interventions by democratic and authoritarian superpowers to lead to similar declines in 
democracy.    
 
Which of these perspectives finds more support in the data?  The rest of this paper is 
devoted to answering this question. 
 
4)  Data 
 
The focus of this paper is on superpower interventions to install and prop up the leaders 
of other countries during the Cold War.  Recently declassified documents reveal that 
most such Cold War interventions took the form of operations organized by the covert 
services of the superpowers, namely the CIA/KGB.  There is no pre-existing dataset that 
comprehensively captures such operations.  Recent contributions to the Cold War history 
literature (much of which is based on recently declassified documents) make it possible 
to identify which countries were subject to such interventions.  We have thus relied on 
this literature, supplemented by our own archival research, to construct a dataset of 
superpower interventions to install and prop up leaders of other countries that includes 
covert interventions.  We offer citations to accompany every case that we have identified 
as an intervention. 
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The variables in the dataset are as follows.  Each variable has one variant which captures 
a US intervention and one which captures a Soviet intervention: 
 
1)  ONSET- This variable is coded as one in the period in which a leader is installed in 
office with the support of the covert services of a superpower.  This may be either via a 
coup or by providing slush funds for elections.  
 
2)  FAILED- Coded as one for all periods in which a superpower initiates efforts to 
install a leader in office, but is unsuccessful in its efforts. 
 
3)  COUNTER-Coded as one for periods in which a superpower organizes 
counterinsurgency operations for a leader who was not installed in office by the 
superpower.  (One may think of this as an exclusively counterinsurgency based 
intervention.) 
 
4)  OFFSET-Coded as one for the first point of time after an onset in which a superpower 
explicitly relinquishes its ability to select the leader of a country.  This may be by force 
(for example in the case of Iran in 1979) or voluntary (as in the case of Gorbachev and 
Eastern European satellites in the late 1980s). 
 
5) INTERMED-This variable captures superpower meddling in periods other than onset 
and offset periods.   It is coded as one for all periods between ONSET and OFFSET as 
well as for periods coded as one for COUNTER.   
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6) INVASION-Coded as one for all periods in which a superpower army invades a 
country and successfully installs a leader in office.  (Covert onsets and invasions are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, since invasions and covert operations may be used 
simultaneously to install a leader.) 
 
7) INTERVENTION-This is our omnibus measure of successful superpower meddling in 
the domestic affairs of other countries.  (Success here refers to successfully installing a 
leader via covert service operations, successfully organizing counterinsurgency 
operations, successfully installing a leader after invading a country, or successfully 
propping up a leader in office.)   All country periods coded as one on either ONSET, 
COUNTER, INVASION, or INTERMED, plus periods not covered by these variables 
when the literature indicates a leader is depending heavily on superpower support for 
survival in office (prop ups) are coded as ones.  Note that offset periods are coded as prop 
up periods (and thus as intervention periods) if the offset does not occur the very 
beginning of a period, which is generally the case.  This is so because the portion of the 
offset period prior to the actual occurrence of the offset is logically a time when the 
superpower has not relinquished control over leadership selection. 
 
Our core analysis covers 127 countries (see Data Appendix A), of which 24 were subject 
to leaders installed with CIA involvement and 16 to leaders installed with KBG/MGB 
involvement.   While the sample is very large we note that we are unable to handle a few 
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partitioned/reunified countries such as Pakistan and Yemen due to difficulties in 
gathering clean data on controls for different segments of a national unit. 
 
We are aware of the fact that we may be missing some “secret” interventions but we see 
no reason why these omissions should be systematically biased in a way that helps our 
results.  If anything, the incentives for the superpowers to reveal an intervention should 
be greatest if the outcome is positive from an institutional standpoint so, if anything, we 
are likely to be misclassifying some interventions that had adverse outcomes as non-
interventions.  Furthermore, a secret intervention is most likely to be ultimately revealed 
in environments that ended up having strong transparent institutional environments.  
This, of course, would only make it harder to find support for our hypotheses. 
 
In order to provide time for the institutional effects of interventions to work themselves 
out we conduct our main analysis in a panel setting with five year periods.  The goal is to 
see if an intervention in one five year period is associated with an improvement or 
deterioration in democracy in the succeeding five year period.  The Cold War may most 
plausibly be claimed to have begun in 1947 with the announcement of the Truman 
doctrine, and have ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  However, if we use 
this entire period we are left with periods of uneven length.  To ensure that all periods are 
of equal length the first period for which we code interventions is 1950-54.  The last 
period for which we code interventions is 1985-89.  In order to ensure that we do not lose 
interventions in the 1947-49 period we classify these as having occurred in Period 1.3 
                                                 
3 Note that not all interventions began with or ended with the Cold War. There are a small number of cases 
of states where there was already superpower influence well before the Cold War began (American 
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In conducting this analysis we are careful to ensure that we are not simply capturing a 
correlation that results from interventions being aimed primarily at authoritarian regimes, 
or by an automatic contemporaneous adjustment of the democracy score in response to an 
external intervention.  We rule out that we are capturing such effects by controlling for 
the level of democracy in the period of the intervention, and observing the effect of the 
intervention on democracy in the subsequent five year period.  In addition we use 
instruments to address the endogeneity of interventions to anticipated levels of 
democracy.  (Our precise strategy to address endogeneity is described in the next 
section.) 
 
With regard to our dependent variable, we use the two measures of democracy that are 
most widely used in political science.  The first, called REG, is from Przeworski and 
colleagues and is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 in the presence of an 
authoritarian regime (Alvarez et al. 2000).  The measure is behavioral in the sense that a 
country is only classified as being democratic if it displays turnover in office following 
an election.  This procedure acts as a safeguard against counting rigged elections which 
perpetuate the tenure of the incumbent as democratic elections.  The second measure of 
democracy that we use is the continuous measure from Polity.4  This is a subjective 
measure that takes values from -10 to 10.  Unlike the REG measure this measure is 
                                                                                                                                                 
influence in Liberia, Ethiopia, and gulf oil states), or where it continued after the Cold War ended 
(continuing American support to Soeharto in Indonesia and Habre in Chad). In the former cases, we do not 
show an ONSET with the beginning of the Cold War, and in the latter cases we do not show an OFFSET 
with the end of the Cold War. We require hard evidence of superpower withdrawal to code an OFFSET 
during or at the end of the Cold War. 
4The data is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. 
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increasing in the degree of democracy.  Since we are conducting a panel analysis using 
five year periods, we use five year averages of these measures.  (The REG measure thus 
takes values between 0 and 1 depending on the proportion of years spent as an 
authoritarian regime in a five year period.) 
 
We use REG as our core measure of democracy and only use Polity for conducting 
robustness checks.  We do so because we believe that it is especially important to be 
wary of subjective measures of democracy in the context of this project.  The subjectivity 
of Polity is a special concern for this paper given that Polity estimates are subjective 
assessments from the perspective of the western bloc, which was of course one of the 
participants in the Cold War.  There is thus cause for concern that Polity may overstate 
the degree of democracy in countries in which the United States intervened.  There is no 
such concern with respect to REG because it is behaviorally based, hinging on observed 
turnover in government following an election, rather than based on subjective 
assessments.    
 
In addition to lagged democracy, we control for the main variables that have been 
identified in the political science literature as influencing democracy.  As Przeworski and 
his colleagues have found, democracy is significantly influenced by per capita GDP 
(Alvarez et al. 2000).  We thus include log GDP per capita as a control variable.  The 
widest available coverage of GDP comes from the dataset created by Angus Maddison 
(2003).  This is of special interest to us because Maddison takes great pains to generate 
GDP estimates for countries that were part of the Soviet bloc.  Missing data from other 
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conventional sources is heavily skewed towards countries that experienced Soviet 
interventions, which is obviously a serious problem for the subject of this paper.  One 
statistic which should reassure readers that our results are not driven by quirks in 
Maddison’s approach to assessing GDP is that GDP values in his data set are highly 
correlated to those of the widely used GDNGD (Growth Development Network Growth 
Data) data set.  (The correlation is 98%.)  We also conduct robustness checks using GDP 
data from GDNGD for reassurance.  
 
While per capita GDP is the primary variable associated with democracy, Haggard and 
Kaufmann have argued that bad economic times in general influence the propensity for 
democracy (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).   We thus also include controls for GDP 
growth from Maddison and GDNGD.  We additionally include a control variable 
capturing the length of time since the last transition from democracy/dictatorship as a 
means of addressing duration dependence.  Continental dummies are always included, 
given the propensity of some regions such as the Middle East for having authoritarian 
regimes.  In our instrumental variables regressions (described in the next section) we use 
data for distance of each country’s capital from Moscow from Gleditsch and Ward 
(2001).  All regressions include dummies for each time period.   Summary statistics are 
presented in Appendix Table 1.  
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5) Identification strategy- 
 
Identification is a serious issue for the question at hand.  Interventions may be driven by 
the institutional environment or by the same factors that contribute to worse institutions. 
We adopt two strategies for addressing endogeneity.   One captures between country 
variation in the effects of interventions, while the second captures within country 
variation.   We describe these strategies below. 
 
One strategy, which captures between country variation, relies on using instruments that 
hinge on an explicit causal logic.  As the instrument for US interventions we use the 
distance of a country’s capital from Moscow.  (We log this value to alleviate the effects 
of outliers.)  The reasoning behind this first stage regression is straightforward.  Efforts 
by the US to interfere in the politics of countries that are in the proximity of Moscow are 
relatively likely to be perceived by the Soviet leadership as threatening to its security.  
The US is thus most likely to anticipate stiff resistance from Moscow to interventions in 
such countries, and US interventions are more likely to be located elsewhere.  It follows 
that the smaller the distance of a country’s capital from Moscow, the lower the likelihood 
of a US intervention.5  
 
While it is clear that distance from Moscow is not subject to reverse causality we must 
also consider other ways in which this distance may affect democracy, and control for 
                                                 
5The above logic implies that an intervention by the US close to Moscow would be perceived as more 
threatening than one that is close to Vladivostok.  While this is plausible another potential instrument may 
be provided by the distance from the nearest Soviet border.  Unfortunately there is no reliable measure of 
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them in order to satisfy the exclusion restriction.  For instance, countries that are 
extremely distant from Moscow may receive less investment from and trade less with the 
Soviet Union, resulting in slower growth.  Slower growth may, in turn, be associated with 
the collapse of political regimes.  We thus control for economic growth and per capita 
GDP (in addition to lagged democracy) in all our specifications.    
 
The analogous instrument to use for Soviet interventions would be distance from 
Washington D.C.  However, geography and history conspire to make this a poor indicator 
of which potential Soviet interventions would be perceived as threatening to US security.  
Specifically, ever since the Monroe doctrine of 1823 the United States has clearly 
communicated that it considers any interventions in the Americas by other powers to be 
unacceptable.  South America happens to be an exceptionally long continent, which 
means that many countries that are far from Washington D.C. are also ruled out as viable 
targets for Soviet interventions thanks to the Monroe doctrine.  The consequence is that it 
is not possible to get a strong first stage for Soviet interventions using distance from 
Washington D.C. as an instrument.  We thus use an alternative instrumentation strategy 
for Soviet interventions. 
 
We use the US security perimeter as of the fall of Nazi Berlin (May 1945) as our 
instrument for Soviet interventions.  This perimeter is the boundary generated by the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823 (the Americas) and the relatively rapid collapse of the Nazi 
eastern front (which subsequently limited the US sphere of influence in Europe), namely 
                                                                                                                                                 
distance from the closest border at this point in time. We ran regressions with a preliminary (as yet 
unfinalised) version of a dataset that includes such data and got very similar results. 
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the Americas and Europe west of Germany.  We believe this historically generated 
perimeter is not the consequence of reverse causality for the following reasons.  This 
perimeter clearly emerged as a consequence of factors long in the historical past (the 
Monroe doctrine) and short term military considerations (anticipated Axis resistance on 
the Western vs. Eastern fronts in World War II), and not as a consequence of the quality 
of institutions in the countries included within the perimeter.  Historians are in broad 
agreement that the extent of the Soviet western advance in World War II was agreed 
upon between Stalin and Roosevelt in Teheran (1943) and Yalta (early 1945) on the basis 
of considerations of the most efficient means to topple the Nazis.  Furthermore, the 
perimeter as of May 1945 clearly did not emerge as a consequence of anticipated Soviet 
expansionism.   As the Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis puts it: 
 
Roosevelt had built his whole strategy upon the expectation that the wartime 
alliance would survive the end of the war…Although concerned during the last 
months of his life about the increasing frequency of misunderstandings with the 
Russians, he at no point sought to contest the substantial expansion of Soviet 
influence in Europe and Asia that the end of the war would bring…Despite 
obvious differences in personality and style, Harry S. Truman continued 
Roosevelt’s policy upon coming into office… During his first months in office he 
firmly rejected proposals from Winston Churchill and some of his own advisors 
that would have denied the Russians previously agreed upon occupation zones in 
Central Europe and North East Asia.  “I was having as much difficulty with Prime 
Minister Churchill as I was having with Stalin,” the new president noted in May 
of 1945.  As late as the fall of that year, both Truman and his new secretary of 
state, James P. Byrnes, were still relying upon the establishment of a personal 
relationship with Stalin as the best way to overcome the difficulties that had 
already begun to emerge in the Soviet-American relationship.6   
  
For our perimeter instrument we code all countries in the Americas and all Western 
European countries excluding Greece and Finland as ones.  Greece is coded as a zero 
                                                 
6Gaddis 1987, 26. 
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because it was only included as part of the perimeter with the announcement of the 
Truman doctrine in 1947.  Finland’s status, of course, remained ambiguous for years after 
the end of World War II and was never entirely resolved until the end of the Cold War.   
We code Asian countries as being outside the US security perimeter as of May 1945.  
This is because there was considerable uncertainty about where the US considered its 
perimeter to lie in Asia at this time.  (Recall that the Japanese surrender still lay ahead by 
several months.  Also, a great deal of uncertainty existed even as late as in 1950, forcing 
Acheson to make his fateful “clarifying” speech at the National Press Club on January 
12.) 
 
The causal logic for the perimeter instrument is also straightforward.  We should expect 
the Soviets to anticipate relatively high resistance from the United States for intervening 
in a country that is inside the US’s historically established security perimeter.  This 
would make Soviet interventions outside the perimeter more likely, causing us to expect a 
negative relationship between being within the US perimeter and Soviet meddling.  Once 
again we are careful to control for growth and per capita GDP since being within the US 
perimeter may be associated with more trade and investment and therefore higher growth 
and development (as the Marshall plan suggests), which in turn can help the quality of 
institutions.   
 
Do we additionally expect a negative effect of distance from Moscow on Soviet 
interventions and a positive effect of the US security perimeter on US interventions?  We 
are less confident about these relationships for two reasons.  A potential positive 
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relationship between Soviet interventions and proximity to Moscow may be washed out 
by Soviet interventions in countries that are far from Moscow and also outside the US 
perimeter.  Likewise, a positive relationship between the US perimeter and US 
interventions may be washed out by US interventions in countries outside the perimeter 
that are far from Moscow.  While not ruling out these alternative causal paths, our 
identification strategy thus hinges on the former two proposed causal links rather than on 
the latter two links. 
 
The instruments described above are obviously invariant over time, which rules out the 
use of country fixed effects.  We address concerns about omitted variables bias by 
controlling for the lagged value of the dependent variable.  Note that by conducting our 
analysis in a panel setting we are also improving considerably on a cross country analysis 
by explicitly controlling for the effects of economic shocks which, as mentioned earlier, 
have been found to affect the level of democracy.  (We are effectively allowing the 
predicted values of interventions to respond to changes in the values of time varying 
control variables as well as to common shocks to the global economy.)  
We conclude our description of this instrumentation strategy by noting that our 
instruments offer the added strength of not being correlated with the condition of 
institutions at the end of World War II since very few countries in the world were 
democracies in May 1945.  
 
Our second strategy to address endogeneity is aimed at capturing within country 
variation.  We instrument for interventions using the GMM estimator developed by 
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Blundell and Bond (1998).  The estimator incorporates the lagged value of the dependent 
variable on the right hand side.  The estimator uses equations in first differences 
(instrumented by extended lags of levels) as well as equations in levels (instrumented by 
first differences).  The Blundell and Bond estimator is thus referred to as the system 
GMM estimator.  The identification assumptions of this estimator are that transient errors 
are serially uncorrelated, that initial conditions are predetermined, and that country 
specific effects are uncorrelated with the differenced values of the right hand side 
variables.  We are careful to conduct tests of AR(2) in differences which must be 
surmounted for the identification strategy to be valid.  In addition we test for violations of 
the exclusion restriction by using the Hansen overidentification test. 
6) Results- 
 
We begin in Table 1 by addressing endogeneity using the distance from Moscow and the 
U.S security perimeter as of May 1945 as instruments for US and Soviet interventions.  
Since we only have two instruments we can only include two endogenous variables for 
interventions in this section of our analysis. The regressions in Table 1 thus capture the 
effects of our omnibus measures of successful interventions, US INTERVENTION and 
SOVIET INTERVENTION.  In Table 2, where we use the multiple instruments offered 
by the GMM technique, we assess the independent effects of the numerous intervention 
variables listed in Section 4.   
 
We begin Table 1 with the results for an OLS specification in which we place our core 
measure of democracy (REG) on the left hand side, and control for the lagged dependent 
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variable, per capita GDP, GDP growth, duration dependence, continental dummies, and 
time dummies (column 1).  We then proceed to our core instrumental variables results.  
Our interest is in seeing how an intervention in a given five year period affects 
democracy in the subsequent five year period, and to see if this effect differs depending 
on whether the intervening superpower is a democracy (the US) or a dictatorship (the 
Soviet Union).   
 
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that both US and Soviet interventions result in significantly 
lower levels of democracy in the next five year period in an OLS setting.  (Recall that the 
REG measure is decreasing in democracy.)  The point estimates for US and Soviet 
interventions are statistically indistinguishable from each other (p=.99).  We now check if 
these results are robust to addressing endogeneity with the two instruments listed above.  
Column 2 presents the second stage result of the same specification as column 1, with the 
exception that US and Soviet interventions are instrumented by distance from Moscow 
and the US security perimeter in May 1945.  Corresponding first stage results are 
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 2.  The first stage results are in 
accordance with our theoretical expectations.  Distance from Moscow is positively 
associated with US interventions.  The US security perimeter and distance from Moscow 
are negatively associated with Soviet interventions.  The Cragg-Donald F-statistic is 14 
(vs. a benchmark of 10), which suggests that the specification does not suffer from weak 
instrument problems.  The second stage results reveal that both US and Soviet 
interventions are negatively associated with democracy in the following five year period 
(column 1).  US interventions are significant at the 1% level, while Soviet interventions 
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are significant at the 10% level.  The substantive effect of a US intervention is to reduce 
democracy by 36%, while the effect of a Soviet intervention is to reduce democracy by 
33%.  The point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from each other.  (The p 
value for the test for the equality of coefficients is .95).  This is the core instrumental 
variables result of this paper, which we now submit to various robustness checks. 
 
In column 3 we include failed interventions in our definition of interventions, thereby 
capturing the effects of all meddling (successful as well as unsuccessful).  The new 
intervention variables with this addition are called US INTERVENTION2 and SOVIET 
INTERVENTION2.  Column 3 shows that both US and Soviet interventions are still 
associated with significant declines in democracy and the point estimates are once again 
indistinguishable from each other (p=.81.).  (The first stage results are very similar to 
those observed for the column 2 specification and are displayed in columns 3 and 4 of 
Appendix Table 2.)    
 
The regressions presented so far use GDP and GDP growth data from Maddison.   As 
mentioned, this is the appropriate source for this paper because it is the only one which 
offers adequate coverage of countries that lie within the Soviet bloc. (If we were to rely 
on one of the other widely disseminated sources most of these countries would be 
dropped from the analysis when controlling for the most significant alternative 
determinants of democracy, which would leave us unable to accurately estimate the 
effects of Soviet interventions.)  While using alternative income and growth controls 
effectively rules out comprehensively estimating the effects of Soviet interventions, it is 
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still useful to see if the core results for US interventions hold when we use GDP data 
from another source.  We conduct this robustness check using GDP and GDP growth data 
from the Growth Development Network Growth Database (GDNGD).  The consequence 
of switching from Maddison to this source is that the sample size drops from 878 to 596.  
The smaller sample size here is largely a consequence of missing observations for several 
countries with Soviet interventions such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, North 
Korea, Sudan, North Korea, Bulgaria, Poland, Somalia, and Afghanistan.  In line with 
this pattern of missing observations, we should expect the result for US interventions 
alone to be robustly significant in GDNGD based specifications.7   
 
Our results are in accord with this expectation.  Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 present 
second stage results for specifications that are the same as those in columns 2 and 3, with 
the exception that GDNGD controls replace Maddison.  The first stages for US 
interventions remain strong in these specifications. (See Appendix Table 2, columns 5-8.) 
Unsurprisingly, given the pattern of missing data, the first stages for Soviet interventions 
are much weaker with the GDNGD controls.  As column 4 in Table 1 shows, US 
interventions have a significant negative relationship with democracy in the next five 
year period.  In column 5 we include failed interventions in our definition of 
interventions and the second stage results are substantially unchanged.   
 
In columns 6-9 of Table 1 we conduct the same exercise as in columns 2-5, but using the 
Polity measure of democracy.  (The column 1 OLS result is robust to replacing REG with 
                                                 
7 We are entirely unable to estimate the effects of Soviet military interventions and counterinsurgencies in 
the GDNGD specifications on account of missing data for Soviet bloc countries. 
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Polity and is available upon request.)  As mentioned in Section 4, we do not use Polity as 
our core measure of democracy because this is a subjective measure (unlike REG which 
is behavioral).  Additionally the subjective assessments are entirely made from one side 
of the East-West divide, which generates the possibility of bias which could be 
problematic when comparing the effects of Soviet and US interventions.  We have special 
reasons for concern about the subjectivity of the Polity measure here because we have 
several cases where Polity codes countries subjectively as democracies following a 
period of US intervention, while REG codes these same countries behaviorally as 
dictatorships in the same period.8  In contrast to 22 discrepancies of this type, there are 
only two instances of such discrepancies following Soviet interventions.  Other 
discrepancies between the two variables are limited in scope (there are three cases of 
REG coding a democracy and Polity a dictatorship in the wake of a US intervention score 
of one, and two instances of the same in the wake of a Soviet intervention score of one).  
Overall, we should thus expect the negative results for US interventions to be weaker for 
the Polity measure than with the REG measure. 
 
Columns 6 and 7 use the Maddison controls, and use the INTERVENTION and 
INTERVENTION2 variables respectively.  The strong first stages are displayed in 
Appendix Table 3, columns 1-4.  The second stage estimate in Column 6 shows that 
Soviet interventions are negatively associated with democracy.  (Recall that unlike the 
REG measure, the Polity measure is increasing in democracy.)  US interventions fall 
short of significance (p=.13), but the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from 
                                                 
8 The countries are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, South 
Africa, Syria, Taiwan, South Korea, Laos, and the Philippines. 
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that for Soviet interventions (p=.25).  Column 7 shows that including failed interventions 
in the definition of interventions leaves the results essentially unchanged.    
 
In columns 8 and 9 we repeat the specifications from columns 6 and 7 with the exception 
that we replace the Maddison controls with GDNGD.   The first stages for US 
interventions are once again strong.  The first stages for Soviet interventions are weaker, 
which is to be expected given the pattern of missing observations in GDNGD.  (See 
Appendix Table 3, columns 5-8.)  The pattern of missing observations in GDNGD should 
bias against finding a significant result for the Soviet intervention variables.  
Furthermore, the difference between REG and Polity codings in countries with US 
interventions should cause us to expect a weaker result for US interventions with Polity 
rather than with REG.  Both of these expectations are borne out.  While US interventions 
emerge as significant in both columns 8 and 9, the substantive effects (in terms of the 
percentage decline in democracy) are smaller in the Polity based specifications than in 
the REG based specifications (columns 4 and 5).9  The coefficient for Soviet 
interventions is not significant, but is still statistically indistinguishable from that for US 
interventions in both cases (p of .79 and .84 respectively).   
 
 In Table 2 we check if our core instrumental variables result, which was presented in 
column 2 of Table 1, is robust to addressing endogeneity in a different way, namely via 
the Blundell and Bond GMM technique.  In column 1 of Table 2 we present the GMM 
analogue of our core instrumental variables result.  The AR(2) and Hansen tests do not 
indicate problems with identification;  the null hypothesis of no AR(2) cannot be rejected 
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(p=.64), and the same is the case for the fulfillment of the exclusion restriction (Hansen 
test p value of 1.)  Similar to what we observed in our core IV regression, both US and 
Soviet interventions emerge as having significant negative effects on democracy. 
 
Since the GMM technique is based on using multiple lags of levels and differences as 
instruments, we are not limited to only including two endogenous intervention variables 
in our GMM analysis.  In GMM we can thus separately examine the independent effects 
of onsets, offsets, counterinsurgency support, and military invasions.  We now thus focus 
on estimating the independent effects of these variables.  
 
Column 2 shows that both US and Soviet onsets are negatively associated with 
democracy (at the 5% and 10% levels respectively).  US and Soviet offsets are positively 
associated with democracy (also at the 5% and 10% level respectively).  Failed 
interventions and counterinsurgency support have no effect on democracy.  US military 
interventions are positively associated with democracy here, but this latter result turns out 
not be robust.10   
 
In column 3 we address the question of whether the negative effects of onsets and the 
positive effects of offsets are robust to controlling for the periods between onsets and 
offsets in addition to counterinsurgencies.  The variables USA INTERMED and SOVIET 
INTERMED capture the effects of these periods.  The results for US and Soviet onsets 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 The substantive effects here are approximately 26% with Polity as opposed to 36% with REG. 
10 This result is based on a very small sample of invasions (Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama).   
As we will see later, this latter result also does not survive our robustness check using the Polity measure of 
democracy. 
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and offsets remain robust to the addition of the INTERMED variables as controls.  The 
point estimates for onsets are again very similar to those seen earlier.  The substantive 
effect of the US installing a leader is to reduce the level of democracy in the next five 
year period by 18%.  The corresponding effect of a Soviet onset is 23%.  We are unable 
to reject the null hypothesis that the two point estimates are equal to each other (p=.70).  
We consider these to be our core GMM results. 
 
As far as the INTERMED variables themselves are concerned, most of the changes in 
democracy scores in the case of US interventions appear to be occurring in the immediate 
wake of onsets and offsets.  When it comes to Soviet interventions the relative sizes of 
the point estimates also indicate that onsets and offsets generate larger marginal effects 
on democracy than an intermed year, although the SOVIET INTERMED variable does 
achieve significance (unlike USA INTERMED).  
 
In column 4 we check if the results for our most expansive specification (the one with the 
INTERMED controls) are robust to replacing the REG measure with the Polity measure 
of democracy on the left hand side.  A decrease in the Polity measure indicates a decline 
in democracy.   We note that identification here is less robust than with REG.   (The null 
hypothesis of no AR(2) cannot be rejected at the 95% level, but is on the border of 
rejection at the 90% level.)  The results for US and Soviet onsets are robust.  From a 
quantitative perspective a USA onset is associated with a 19% decline in democracy, 
while a Soviet onset is associated with a 22% decline in democracy, which is very similar 
to what we observed with the REG measure.  These point estimates are also statistically 
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indistinguishable from each other.  (The p for the test for the equality of coefficients is 
.84).  (The earlier result for US military invasions does not survive this robustness check 
and the sign is in fact reversed.) 
 
The regressions presented so far in Table 2 use data for GDP and GDP growth from 
Maddison.   As mentioned, this is the appropriate source for this paper because it is the 
only one which offers adequate coverage of countries within the Soviet bloc.  Just as we 
did in Table 1 we now check for the consequences of using GDP and GDP growth data 
from the Growth Development Network Growth Database (GDNGD) in place of 
Maddison.  Recall that we should expect the result for US interventions alone to be 
robustly significant in GDNGD based specifications.11   
 
Our findings are once again in accordance with this expectation.  Columns 5-8 are 
analogous to columns 1-4, with the only difference being that GDNGD controls replace 
Maddison controls.  Column 5 shows that our omnibus measure of US interventions is 
negatively associated with democracy (as per the REG measure).  Column 6 shows that 
when we consider separately consider onsets, offsets, military invasions, and 
counterinsurgency support, US onsets are negatively associated with democracy.  Soviet 
onsets are insignificant but display the same sign as US onsets, while US offsets, Soviet 
offsets, and US military invasions are significantly associated with more democracy.  
(Recall the very small number of US military invasions, which should cause us to treat 
this latter result with caution.)  Once again we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
                                                 
11 We are entirely unable to estimate the effects of Soviet military interventions and counterinsurgencies in 
the GDNGD specifications on account of missing data for Soviet bloc countries. 
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equality between the US and Soviet onset point estimates (p=.74).  In column 7 we use 
the INTERMED control variable (which includes periods between onsets and offsets in 
addition to including counterinsurgencies) and find that the results are similar.  In column 
8 we replace the REG measure with the Polity measure of democracy.  While the 
negative effect of US onsets remains significant, Soviet onsets also emerge as significant 
in this specification and the point estimates are again statistically indistinguishable from 
one another.  
 
Overall, we thus find that US and Soviet interventions during the Cold War had 
significant adverse consequences for democracy.  We also find that the interventions of 
the two superpowers were similar in their effects irrespective of the fact that one was a 
democracy and the other was not.    
  
7) Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have demonstrated that superpower interventions in the domestic politics 
of other countries during the Cold War had substantial adverse consequences for 
democracy in the intervened countries.  How far can one extrapolate from the history of 
the Cold War to interventions justified by the war on terror?  We have no rigorous 
empirical basis on which to calibrate the relevance of the past to the present, but to the 
extent that commonalities exist some qualified conclusions can be made.  To the extent 
that US leaders continue to share the Cold War world view that repressing anti-US 
groups overseas enhances security, the US government has incentives to install leaders 
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who have powerful incentives to repress anti-US groups in their countries.  It is clear that 
under these conditions our findings offer a negative prognosis for democracy in 
intervened countries.
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Table 1- Instrumental Variables Results 
 
 REG POLITY 
 MADDISON CONTROLS GDNGD CONTROLS MADDISON CONTROLS GDNGD CONTROLS 
 OLS Interv. Interv2 Interv. Interv2 Interv. Interv2 Interv. Interv2 
.0527*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.279*** 0.276*** -1.61 -1.54 -2.12** -2.03** 
US Intervention (.0175) (0.0869) (0.0870) (0.0768) (0.0772) (1.07) (1.07) (1.01) (1.00) 
.0526** 0.236* 0.219* 0.0967 0.101 -2.75* -2.59* -1.62 -1.61 Soviet 
Intervention (.0248) (0.121) (0.116) (0.153) (0.159) (1.47) (1.37) (1.97) (1.98) 
.777*** 0.699*** 0.695*** 0.651*** 0.652*** 0.767*** 0.769*** 0.722*** 0.725*** 
Democracy (.0346) (0.0555) (0.0572) (0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0442) (0.0440) (0.0474) (0.0462) 
.0206*** 0.0203** 0.0199** 0.0195** 0.0187** 0.136* 0.141* 0.0735 0.0807 Time since 
Transition (.00648) (0.00827) (0.00853) (0.00881) (0.00892) (0.0819) (0.0841) (0.0944) (0.0969) 
-.0403*** -0.0346** -0.0350** -0.0309 -0.0305 0.494*** 0.492*** 0.511** 0.510** Log (GDP) per 
capita (.0130) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.178) (0.181) (0.254) (0.257) 
-.125 0.120 0.173 0.00424 0.00422 2.28 1.95 -0.0242 -0.0238 
GDP growth (.205) (0.264) (0.283) (0.00348) (0.00352) (3.77) (3.91) (0.0562) (0.0558) 
.116*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.301*** 0.298*** -1.88*** -1.83*** -2.82*** -2.74*** 
Africa (.0263) (0.0591) (0.0588) (0.0595) (0.0580) (0.639) (0.652) (0.832) (0.826) 
.0468* 0.0735** 0.0691* 0.115** 0.115** -0.737** -0.693** -0.925** -0.904** 
Asia (.0242) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0488) (0.0482) (0.339) (0.337) (0.409) (0.403) 
.125*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.226*** 0.225*** -2.38*** -2.33*** -3.00*** -2.94*** 
Middle East (.0286) (0.0438) (0.0445) (0.0566) (0.0570) (0.483) (0.477) (0.706) (0.709) 
          
CD F-stat - 13.6 12.1 19.7 15.2 10.9 10.0 19.8 16.9 
N 878 878 878 596 596 878 878 596 596 
p(US-RUS = 0) 0.99 0.95 0.81 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.79 0.84 
 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses. 
Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.
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Table 2: GMM Results 
 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
 MADDISON CONTROLS GDNGD CONTROLS 
 REG POLITY REG POLITY 
.0862***    .114***    
US interv. (.0289)    (.0422)    
.112**    .0189    Soviet 
interv. (.0530)    (.0717)    
 0.114** 0.122** -1.74*  0.185*** 0.195*** -2.64** 
USA onset  (0.0563) (0.0568) (0.985)  (0.0694) (0.0707) (1.15) 
 0.146* 0.156** -2.00*  0.264 0.259 -4.61* Soviet 
onset  (0.0763) (0.0766) (1.08)  (0.219) (0.211) (2.72) 
 -0.106** -0.100* 0.475  -0.133** -0.138** 1.27 
USA offset  (0.0540) (0.0533) (0.915)  (0.0649) (0.0592) (0.872) 
 -0.204* -0.194* 3.43***  -0.256* -0.243* 4.66 Soviet 
offset  (0.105) (0.101) (1.25)  (0.148) (0.139) (1.32) 
 0.0481 0.0587 -1.55*  0.0916 0.116 -1.73 
USA failed  (0.0544) (0.0537) (0.855)  (0.154) (0.152) (1.78) 
 -0.113 -0.108 1.07*  -0.181 -0.156 2.24*** Soviet 
failed  (0.0761) (0.0793) (0.639)  (0.117) (0.117) (0.821) 
 -0.359*** -0.351*** 3.94  -0.357*** -0.324*** 3.12 USA 
invasion  (0.0550) (0.0487) (2.81)  (0.0694) (0.0447) (2.02) 
 0.0137 -0.00288 0.0432  Dropped Dropped Dropped Soviet 
invasion  (0.0579) (0.0527) (0.721)     
 0.0421    0.111   USA 
counter  (0.0563)    (0.0930)   
 0.00391    Dropped   Soviet 
counter  (0.0391)       
  0.0297 -0.223   0.0668 -1.39*** USA 
Intermed.   (0.0287) (0.343)   (0.0463) (0.532) 
  0.101*** -1.58***   0.136 -2.46*** Soviet 
Intermed.   (0.0334) (0.378)   (0.0849) (0.613) 
0.691*** 0.762*** 0.732*** 0.794*** .580*** 0.678*** 0.654*** 0.697*** Lagged 
democracy (0.0569) (0.0332) (0.0370) (0.0321) (0.0683) (0.0492) (0.0506) (0.0430) 
0.0227*** 0.0193*** 0.0177*** 0.0720 0.0294*** 0.0157** 0.0139* 0.0277 Time since 
Transition (0.00680) (0.00592) (0.00610) (0.0638) (0.00884) (0.00732) (0.00729) (0.0787) 
-0.0633*** -0.0495*** -0.0489*** 0.707*** -.104*** - -0.0573** 0.973*** Log (GDP) 
per capita (0.0210) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.248) (0.0318) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.343) 
-0.111 -0.213 -0.237 4.79 .00481 0.00156 0.000970 -0.0375 GDP 
growth (0.216) (0.199) (0.204) (3.28) (0.0334) (0.00287) (0.00283) (0.0490) 
0.135*** 0.0862*** 0.108*** -0.952** 0.195*** 0.145*** 0.174*** -1.85*** 
Africa (0.0441) (0.0312) (0.0345) (0.446) (0.0672) (0.0369) (0.0424) (0.582) 
0.0438 0.0354 0.0434 -0.373 0.0541 0.0490 0.0621 -0.380 
Asia (0.0348) (0.0271) (0.0299) (0.348) (0.0564) (0.0373) (0.0402) (0.449) 
0.154*** 0.127*** 0.147*** -2.16*** 0.190*** 0.160*** 0.184*** -2.87*** Middle 
East (0.0373) (0.0296) (0.0338) (0.433) (0.0582) (0.0416) (0.0479) (0.699) 
N 878 878 878 878 596 596 596 596 
AR(2)  p 0.637 0.553 0.604 0.098 0.232 0.135 0.14 0.118 
Hansen p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
US-RUS=0 0.64 0.71 0.7 0.84 0.21 0.74 0.77 0.51 
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Appendix Table 1- Summary Statistics 
 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
USA onset 878 0.0251 0.156 0 1
Soviet onset 878 0.0182 0.134 0 1
USA offset 878 0.0216 0.146 0 1
Soviet offset 878 0.0182 0.134 0 1
USA failed 878 0.0182 0.134 0 1
Soviet failed 878 0.0103 0.101 0 1
USA invasion 878 0.00228 0.0477 0 1
Soviet invasion 878 0.00797 0.0890 0 1
USA counter 878 0.0205 0.142 0 1
Soviet counter 878 0.00456 0.0674 0 1
USA intermed. 878 0.0763 0.266 0 1
Soviet intermed. 878 0.0581 0.234 0 1
USA intervention   878 0.261 0.439 0 1
Soviet intervention 878 0.110 0.314 0 1
USA intervention2 878 0.273 0.446 0 1
Soviet 
intervention2 878 0.121 0.326 0 1
REG 878 0.658 0.455 0 1
Time since REG 
transition 878 2.60 2.12 0 7
Polity2 878 -1.11 7.39 -10 10
Time since Polity2 
Transition 878 2.55 2.13 0 7
Log (GDP) per 
capita MADDISON 878 7.82 1.01 5.86 10.6
GDP growth 
MADDISON 878 0.0176 0.0341 -0.161 0.218
Log (GDP) per 
capita GDNGD 596 8.11 1.01 6.11 10.1
GDP growth 
GDNGD 596 2.01 3.15 -8.29 16.4
Log distance to 
Moscow 878 8.55 0.672 6.84 9.71
USA perimeter 878 0.314 0.465 0 1
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Appendix Table 2:  First Stage Results-REG specifications 
 
 Table 1 Column 2 Table 1 Column 3 Table 1 Column 4 Table 1 Column 5 
USA/Soviet 
intervention USA SOVIET USA SOVIET USA SOVIET USA SOVIET 
0.212*** -0.0794** 0.201*** -0.0743** 0.227*** -0.0346 0.226*** -0.0243Log distance 
to Moscow (0.0485) (0.0321) (0.0477) (0.0325) (0.0468) (0.0246) (0.0468) (0.0264)
-0.00886 -0.307** -0.0336 -0.303** -0.150 -0.226 -0.149 -0.223USA security 
perimeter (0.115) (0.130) (0.111) (0.130) (0.119) (0.144) (0.120) (0.146)
0.194** 0.164*** 0.217** 0.169*** 0.259*** 0.0739** 0.257*** 0.0774*Lagged 
Democracy (0.0809) (0.0551) (0.0793) (0.0555) (0.0825) (0.0371) (0.0826) (0.0417)
0.00100 0.00923 0.000843 0.0117 0.0101 0.00750 0.0123 0.00875Time since 
Transition (0.0194) (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0115) (0.0181) (0.00867) (0.0182) (0.00904)
0.0159 -0.0425* 0.0114 -0.039* -0.0273 -0.0357** -0.0320 -0.0259Log (GDP) 
per capita (0.0439) (0.0226) (0.0439) (0.0231) (0.0437) (0.0162) (0.0440) (0.0203)
-0.423 -0.762** -0.653 -0.807*** -0.00348 -0.00426 -0.00336 -0.00434
GDP growth (0.617) (0.298) (0.615) (0.301) (0.00664) (0.00376) (0.00665) (0.00336)
-0.317** -0.444*** -0.351*** -0.434*** -0.653*** -0.306** -0.650*** -0.287*
Africa (0.127) (0.131) (0.124) (0.132**) (0.130) (0.154) (0.131) (0.158)
-0.119 -0.300** -0.131 -0.289** -0.402*** -0.255* -0.403*** -0.246
Asia (0.138) (0.145) (0.133) (0.145) (0.153) (0.149) (0.154) (0.151)
0.163 -0.466*** 0.116 -0.442*** -0.278* -0.264 -0.280* -0.242
Middle East (0.127) (0.131) (0.124) (0.131) (0.157) (0.164) (0.158) (0.167)
 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by country in Parentheses. 
Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
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Appendix Table 3:  First Stage Results-Polity specifications 
 
 Table 2 Column 6 Table 2 Column 7 Table 2 Column 8 Table 2 Column 9 
USA/Soviet 
intervention USA SOVIET USA SOVIET USA SOVIET USA SOVIET 
0.196*** -0.0728** 0.184*** -0.0658** 0.213*** -0.0231 0.212*** -0.00983Log distance 
to Moscow (0.0469) (0.0319) (0.0460) (0.0333) (0.0462) (0.0241) (0.0462) (0.0278)
0.0394 -0.310** 0.0140 -0.314** -0.105 -0.245* -0.105 -0.252*USA security 
perimeter (0.114) (0.128) (0.109) (0.130) (0.118) (0.144) (0.119) (0.148)
-0.0165*** -0.0102*** -0.0177*** -0.00962*** -0.0197*** -0.00377* -0.0196*** -0.00279Lagged 
Democracy (0.00468) (0.00335) (0.00457) (0.00339) (0.00473) (0.00204) (0.00474) (0.00225)
-0.00665 0.0236** -0.00648 0.0265** -0.000530 0.0190** 0.00158 0.0209**Time since 
Transition (0.0175) (0.0108) (0.0177) (0.0114) (0.0167) (0.00879) (0.0169) (0.00963)
0.0401 -0.0396* 0.0356 -0.0394* 0.00200 -0.0405** -0.00258 -0.0355*Log (GDP) 
per capita (0.0431) (0.0230) (0.0430) (0.0230) (0.0444) (0.0170) (0.0446) (0.0186)
-0.251 -0.657** -0.467 -0.704** -0.00155 -0.00337 -0.00148 -0.00329
GDP growth (0.590) (0.308) (0.588) (0.305) (0.00664) (0.00353) (0.00663) (0.00312)
-0.248* -0.405*** -0.278** -0.401*** -0.577*** -0.303** -0.576*** -0.291*
Africa (0.130) (0.130) (0.127) (0.132) (0.128) (0.151) (0.129) (0.156)
-0.0411 -0.285** -0.0511 -0.282* -0.303* -0.268* -0.307* -0.269*
Asia (0.140) (0.148) (0.134) (0.149) (0.156) (0.149) (0.158) (0.153)
0.168 -0.460*** 0.122 -0.437*** -0.269* -0.273* -0.272* -0.251
Middle East (0.124) (0.129) (0.121) (0.130) (0.152) (0.162) (0.153) (0.165)
 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by country in Parentheses. 
Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
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Data Appendix A:  Countries Included in Analysis 
 
Afghanistan# Djibouti # Korea, South Portugal 
Albania  Dominican Republic Kuwait#  Qatar# 
Algeria  Ecuador  Laos  Romania  
Angola  Egypt  Lebanon# Rwanda  
Argentina  El Salvador  Lesotho  Saudi Arabia  
Australia  Equatorial Guinea  Liberia# Senegal  
Austria  Ethiopia  Libya#  Sierra Leone  
Bahrain  Fiji* Luxembourg* Singapore  
Bangladesh  Finland  Madagascar  Somalia#  
Belgium  France  Malawi  South Africa  
Benin  Gabon  Malaysia  Spain  
Bhutan* Gambia  Mali  Sri Lanka  
Bolivia  Ghana  Mauritania  Sudan  
Botswana  Greece  Mauritius  Swaziland  
Brazil  Guatemala  Mexico  Sweden  
Bulgaria  Guinea  Mongolia  Switzerland  
Burkina Faso  Guinea-Bissau  Morocco  Syria  
Burundi  Guyana* Mozambique  Taiwan  
Cambodia#  Haiti  Myanmar#  Tanzania  
Cameroon  Honduras  Nepal  Thailand  
Canada  Hungary  Netherlands  Togo  
Central African Republic  Iceland* New Zealand  Trinidad and Tobago  
Chad  India  Nicaragua  Tunisia  
Chile  Indonesia  Niger  Turkey  
China  Iran  Nigeria  Uganda  
Colombia  Iraq# Norway  United Arab Emirates# 
Comoros  Ireland  Oman  United Kingdom  
Congo  Israel  Pakistan  Uruguay  
Costa Rica  Italy  Panama  Venezuela  
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Papua New Guinea* Yugoslavia#  
Cuba# Japan  Paraguay  Zaire  
43 
Cyprus* Jordan  Peru  Zambia  
Czechoslovakia# Kenya  Philippines   
Denmark  Korea, North Poland   
 
# Denotes countries not appearing in the GDNGD sample. (Note GDNGD is also missing several periods of GDP data for Eastern 
European countries in the sample). 
* Denotes countries only appearing in the GDNGD sample. 
